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Introduction 
The main purpose of this article is to consider the future 
prospects for economic growth in advanced economies, 
including the UK and Scotland, in the light of recent past 
trends. 
 
In general, the data used throughout this article is shown in 
terms of GDP per capita (in constant price terms). Both 
academic economists (eg. Nick Crafts
1
) and economic 
institutions (eg. OECD
2
) consider that changes in GDP per 
capita are more relevant than simple GDP growth, in terms 
of judging the shifts in real living standards. 
 
However, in most of the following discussion, the same 
general conclusions would also be valid in a GDP growth 
context. 
 
Part One looks at how slow any bounce-back in economic 
growth has been, following the latest recession, especially in 
comparison to other recessions. 
 
Part Two looks at changes to economic growth rates over 
the past four decades for advanced economies and what 
this might imply for future growth rates. 
 
Part Three looks at sources of economic growth and what 
areas of economic policy need to re-considered in order to 
improve future prospects. 
 
Part Four provides a brief summary. 
 
PART 1 – THE CURRENT RECESSION 
VERSUS PAST RECESSIONS 
It is well known that the developed countries, or „advanced 
economies‟, of the world have struggled to emerge from the 
current „Great Recession‟
3
. In comparison to previous world 
downturns the bounce-back has been anaemic and in some 
cases insufficient to regain the peaks seen in 2008. 
 
Worldwide performance 
Figure 1 shows the position for the world as a whole, for 
advanced economies and for emerging market economies, 
in terms of growth in GDP during this recession and the 
three previous slowdowns. 
 
What can be seen in Figure 1 is that: 
 
• for the „advanced economies‟, the recovery has 
been very shallow, imitating what happened in the 
90s. However, in contrast to the 90s, the size of the 
current downturn is much greater, hence the 
expectation that the bounce-back would be strong, 
and the disappointment that it has been so weak; 
• for emerging market economies, the recovery has 
been stronger than after any earlier downturn in the 
past 50 years; 
• for the world as a whole, the recovery has been 
above average and in line with that seen in the 
70s. 
 
UK performance 
This „advanced economies‟ performance is mirrored in the 
performance of the UK economy, in comparison to previous 
downturns. Figure 2 illustrates this point. 
 
UK GDP remains about 4% below its 2008 peak, a poorer 
performance than during any of the previous downturns over 
the last 50 years, or indeed compared with the 1930s. By 
this stage of the cycle, in earlier downturns, GDP had 
returned to, or risen above, its earlier high. 
 
Scottish performance 
The current „Great Recession‟ saw an overall fall in Scottish 
GDP of around 4½%. This is much more than in any of the 
previous recessionary periods (see Chart 1 and Box1). In 
addition, the length of the downturn in Scotland is only 
comparable with that seen in the 80s, though again, the 
position now, four years after peak output, is much worse 
than at the same point in the 80s (-3% on peak output now 
versus -½ % in the 80s). 
 
 
Scotland during downturns 
 
Mid 70s – No growth in 1974, fall of output 1.5% in 1975, 
followed by 3 years of around 2% growth. 
Early 80s – Fall of 2% and then 1.5% in 1980 and 1981, 
followed by 2 years of growth around 1.5% and then 2 
years of above trend (ie, over 1.8%) growth. 
Early 90‟s – Growth of only 0.1% in 1991, followed by 
growth of 1.4% then 2 years of above trend growth. 
 
 
 
What might be the cause(s) of this poorer recovery in 
economic performance in advanced economies? 
 
Depth and breadth of worldwide recession 
Part of the explanation is relatively simple. In previous 
recessions the downturn for advanced economies was not 
so universal and not so deep. 
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Figure 1: Dynamics of global recoveries 
(years on x-axis; t=0 in the year of the trough; indexed to 100 at the trough; in real terms) 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: The UK profile of recession and recovery 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
It is clear from Figure 1, as well as from OECD data
4
, that 
the depth of this recession far exceeds that of any of the 
preceding recessions back to the 70s. In fact, prior to 2010 
(when output fell by 4%), at no time, back to 1970, did the 
OECD area suffer an annual fall in output (see Chart 2). 
 
Even in GDP per capita (ie. living standards) terms, each of 
these earlier recessions had involved a fall of less than 1% 
of GDP and only lasted for 1 year, while, the latest 
recession lasted 2 years and involved an overall decline in 
GDP per capita of 5% during that time. 
In particular, past recessions that we remember in the UK 
tended to coincide with those experienced in the US, hence 
the anglo-american experience concentrates on 1974, 1980- 
82 and 1991. However, in 1974, apart from the UK and the 
USA, only 3 other OECD countries contracted (Denmark, 
Greece and Japan). In 1980-81, apart from the UK, only one 
national economy (Denmark) contracted in both years. In 
1991 both Germany and Japan grew strongly (3% and 5% 
respectively) as did France, Italy, Spain and many others. 
Vol.36 No.1, pp.71-80. 
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Chart 1:  Scottish annual GDP growth rates, %, 1971-2011 
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Chart 2: OECD annual GDP growth rates, %, 1973-2011 
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Table 1:  Annualised growth rates, in constant price terms, GDP per capita 
 
Decades 
Countries 70s 80s 90s 00s (00 to 07) 1970-2010 
Ireland* 3.3 3.3 6.0 0.7 3.0 3.3 
Norway 4.1 2.1 3.1 0.6 1.6 2.5 
Portugal* 3.6 3.1 2.7 0.2 0.6 2.4 
Finland 3.4 2.6 1.7 1.4 2.9 2.3 
Iceland 5.2 1.6 1.5 0.9 3.1 2.3 
Austria 3.5 2.0 2.2 1.1 1.7 2.2 
Japan 3.2 4.1 0.9 0.7 1.5 2.2 
Spain* 2.6 2.6 2.5 0.7 1.8 2.1 
United Kingdom
5 1.8 2.6 2.6 1.1 2.4 2.0 
Belgium 3.1 1.9 1.9 0.8 1.4 1.9 
Germany 2.8 2.2 1.6 1.0 1.4 1.9 
OECD** 2.5 2.3 2.0 0.9 1.7 1.9 
Canada 2.8 1.6 1.9 0.8 1.5 1.8 
Greece* 3.6 0.2 1.8 1.8 3.7 1.8 
Netherlands 2.3 1.7 2.5 0.9 1.6 1.8 
USA 2.2 2.3 2.2 0.6 1.4 1.8 
Scotland 1.5 2.1 2.2 1.2 2.4 1.8 
Australia 1.3 1.5 2.4 1.5 2.1 1.7 
France 3.1 1.8 1.5 0.5 1.1 1.7 
Italy 3.3 2.4 1.6 -0.2 0.7 1.7 
Sweden 1.6 1.9 1.7 1.5 2.6 1.7 
Denmark 1.9 2.0 2.2 0.2 1.3 1.6 
New Zealand 0.7 1.3 1.6 1.3 2.1 1.2 
Switzerland 1.1 1.6 0.5 0.9 1.2 1.0 
 
Sources:  OECD, Scottish Government
6
 
• EU ‘cohesion’ countries.  ** OECD here incorporates an estimate over 34 countries. 
 
 
The impact of this, less than pervasive, worldwide decline in 
previous downturns was twofold: 
 
• there was little, or no, decline in overall OECD 
output; 
• it allowed strugglers to return to growth by tapping 
into a number of, still growing, export markets. 
 
This gives some clue as to why the current „Great 
Recession‟ has proved so difficult to recover from, it is both 
deeper and more widespread than before. Only those 
countries with close trading links and/or control of sought 
after raw commodities (like Australia) have managed to 
avoid recession. Most „advanced economies‟ lack such 
strong links with the faster growing BRICS and other 
„emerging market economies‟. 
 
However, there is another aspect of „advanced economies‟ 
growth that poses difficult questions with regards to whether 
we might reasonably expect a return to historical growth 
rates. This relates to the general slowing of economic 
growth over recent decades in the OECD. 
PART 2 - CHANGES IN GROWTH PATTERNS 
Table 1 shows the annualised growth rates for 23 
„developed‟ OECD countries for the 70s, 80s, 90s and 00s.
4
 
 
Data comparability issues 
 
While the data is (with the exception of Scotland) taken from 
the OECD‟s database, there will inevitably be some 
comparability and consistency issues arising across so 
many countries and so many years. 
 
Changing the start/finish points for calculating growth rates 
would affect the results growth rates over time (see later on 
the OECD study across decades for some reassurance on 
this point). However, the slowdown in growth seen in the 00s 
still stands out, even allowing for the possibility of some 
changes at the margin due to different methodologies and 
start/finish dates. 
 
There are a number of interesting points that emerge from 
an analysis of this table. 
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First, taken across all four decades the average growth rates 
for the 23 „developed‟ countries ranges from 3.3% (Ireland) 
to 1% (Switzerland
7
). Removing the top and bottom outliers 
(Ireland, Norway and Portugal at the top and Denmark, New 
Zealand and Switzerland at the bottom) 
gives a much narrower, from 2.3% (Finland and Iceland) to 
1.7% (Australia, France, Italy and Sweden) across the 
remaining 17 countries. 
 
This range may seem quite narrow but over the full 40 year 
period it amounts to an accumulated difference of 148% (at 
2.3%) growth versus 96% growth (at 1.7%), which illustrates 
how small differences in growth have a large effect when 
compounded over time. 
 
The full 40 year annual growth rate figures also show that 
outstanding performances (whether high, as with Ireland in 
the 90s and Japan in the 80s, or low, as with New Zealand 
in the 70s or Switzerland in the 90s) over a single decade 
are not sustained over longer periods of time. 
 
Second, decade by decade there appears to be a slowing of 
growth rates. This is seen for the OECD as a whole, but is 
even more pronounced in many EU economies, including: 
Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Portugal and 
Spain. 
 
In particular, the 00s has turned out to be a decade of 
relative underperformance in terms of the growth of living 
standards
8
. 
 
Third, unlike in earlier decades there are no high growth 
economies in the 00s. The best performance comes, 
somewhat unexpectedly, from Greece, but at only 1.8% per 
annum. This is followed by Sweden and Australia (both 
1.5% pa). Also, for the first time a country (Italy) exhibited a 
negative annual growth rate (-0.2% pa) over a decade. 
 
Even before the downturn, ie up to 2007, the 00s had been 
a relatively slow growth decade. The 00s to 2007 exhibited 
the slowest annualised growth rate for the OECD as a 
whole, and for 12 of the 23 countries shown, in comparison 
to the previous 3 decades. This slowdown was particularly 
noticeable for the USA, declining from previous decade 
averages of around 2¼% to under 1½% a year. 
 
Fourth, Scotland‟s growth rate was relatively poor in the 70s 
but had improved to around the OECD average in the 80s 
and 90s. In the 00s Scotland‟s performance was above the 
OECD average and in line with that for the UK. However, 
the 00s were still the slowest decade for growth for 
Scotland. Relative to the UK, Scotland underperformed in 
each decade up to the 00s
9
. 
 
Fifth, in 2003, the OECD published a widely referenced 
paper
10 
that looked at GDP per capita growth performances 
across OECD countries over recent decades. 
This study attempted to adjust for differences in cyclical 
positions across countries. Such adjustments made little 
difference to annualised growth rates in the majority of 
cases (seldom shifting annual growth rates per decade by 
more than +/- 0.3 of a percentage point). This suggests that 
the decade by decade results shown in Table 1 should be 
fairly accurate. 
 
The study found that “For the OECD area as a whole, 
cyclically adjusted GDP growth was, on average, lower in 
the 1990s compared with previous decades, continuing the 
well-documented long-run slowdown in growth rates.” This 
slowing down of growth would appear to have continued, 
indeed worsened, in the 00s. 
 
A return to ‘average’ growth? 
Most governments and forecasting bodies in OECD 
countries are expecting a return to more „normal‟ (ie the long 
run, or historical, average) growth rates in the future. 
 
For example, in the UK, the Office for Budget Responsibility 
(OBR) assumes a return in the medium to long term for UK 
productivity growth (GDP per hour) of 2% per annum. This 
is based on a simple average taken over the past 50 
years
11
. Such a growth rate would be almost twice that seen 
in the 00s in the UK. 
 
But is the idea of such a „standard‟ growth rate still relevant? 
The evidence from Table 1 suggests not. Rather, it suggests 
that economic growth in advanced economies has been 
slowing over the past four decades. 
 
If such lower economic growth continues then it will clearly 
impact on the growth of future living standards, as well as 
on future employment prospects. 
 
It will also impinge on the timing with regards to fiscal and 
debt rebalancing. Currently a return to past growth rates in 
GDP is expected to help deliver much of the adjustment in 
the fiscal position in the UK, and elsewhere. Without these 
historic growth rates returning, the government‟s fiscal 
rebalancing date(s) will need to be delayed or, alternatively, 
greater fiscal austerity will be required. 
 
PART 3 – THE SOURCES OF ECONOMIC 
GROWTH AND HOW THEY MIGHT BE 
STRENGTHENED 
 
Sources of growth 
Growth in GDP per capita can be broken down into two main 
areas: productivity, usually measured as output per hour 
worked, and total hours worked. The latter is a combination 
of average hours per worker and the proportion of the 
population who are actually working. 
 
Productivity 
In terms of labour productivity it is important to differentiate 
between a rise in such productivity stemming from reduced 
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employment (as some countries have experienced during 
the Great Recession in many countries) and a rise due to an 
increase in an economy‟s technological dynamism. 
 
The latter drives growth of both the economy and of 
employment. Such growth might arise through: capital 
deepening; an improvement in labour quality; or a factor 
known as total factor productivity (TFP), ie. the organic 
„extra‟ output that is generated by the way that a particular 
set level of skills and capital are combined. TFP is 
sometimes calculated as the residual that remains after 
more readily measurable factors have been adjusted for eg. 
human capital (labour quality) and investment levels (capital 
deepening). 
 
Unfortunately, existing analysis does not break down these 
elements in a way that can be compared with Table 1. Such 
analysis tends to: concentrate on the EU and the USA; does 
not do so decade by decade; does not go beyond 2007; and 
concentrates on the market economy only. 
 
Table 2 does however give some flavour of how the different 
elements contributions are distributed. 
 
Table 2: Decomposition of output growth, market 
economy, EU and USA, 1980-2005 
1995 TFP in market economy activities grew at a similar 
rate in both regions, whereas over the period 1995-2005 it 
grew much faster in the US (see table 2). In contrast, the 
relative growth rates in capital deepening over these two 
periods were quite similar. 
 
Much TFP research work concentrates on the market 
economy sector, but when the public sector is considered, 
results can look very different. For example, the TFP 
contribution has been found to be negative in the public 
sector since 1979 for the UK and the US, and roughly 
neutral for the EU14. This is the opposite finding, for the EU 
vs the US since the mid-to-late 90s, to that seen in the 
market sector. In the public sector it is usually labour quality 
improvements that contribute most to rises in productivity, 
although such productivity gains are generally much lower 
than seen in the market sector, a finding seen across all 
countries. 
 
Hours worked 
At different periods over the last 40 years the total hours 
worked impact on the growth rate has been both negative 
and positive. Overall though, there has been a general 
move over time for hours to fall and for the participation rate 
to rise, with the two effects to some extent offsetting each 
other. 
 
European 
Union (10) 
United States For example, at the EU(
15
) level, analysis suggests that for 
the period 1995-2003 total hours worked rose on 
1980- 
95 
95- 
2005 
1980- 
95 
95- 
2005 
average15, (although the average hours worked fell
16
), 
whereas in the period 1973-1995 total hours worked also 
fell. 
Market economy 
output 
2.1 2.2 3.2 3.6  
The impact such labour participation and average hours 
- Hours Worked -0.5 0.7 1.3 0.7 
- Labour Productivity 2.5 1.5 1.9 2.9 
worked changes can have on relative growth measures is 
highlighted by the position of the EU(15) vs the US in the 
- Labour 
composition 
0.3 0.2 0.2 0.3 period from 1970 to 2000. Over this period the EU(15) 
improved its GDP per hour position from around 75% of the 
- Capital per hour 1.2 1.0 1.0 1.3 
- ICT 0.4 0.5 0.7 1.0 
- non-ICT 0.8 0.4 0.3 0.3 
US performance to almost matching it. However, due to 
declining relative hours worked, relative GDP per capita 
between the two stood still, at just under 80%
17
. 
- Total-factor 
productivity 
1.7 1.1 1.6 2.6  
Debt overhangs 
Beyond the issue of re-invigorating economic growth, 
Source: Table 2.1, „Economic growth in Europe: a comparative 
industry perspective‟, Timmer et al, 2010 
 
Best estimates suggest that for advanced economies 
capital deepening has often been the most important factor 
in labour productivity growth, although over time the 
emphasis has moved from non-IT sources to IT ones
12
. 
 
In terms of labour skills, this element has tended to 
contribute the least, across most advanced economic 
regions
13
. While low, its contribution tends to have been 
more consistent than for other factors. 
 
The impact of TFP on growth has been different when 
looking at the EU(
14
) vs the USA. Over the period 1980- 
careful consideration also has to be given to how to deal 
with existing debt overhangs in many countries. These 
national debt ratios are, and are forecast to remain for some 
years to come, at historically high levels. Recent research 
has indicated the long run damage that this can have on 
economic growth rates
18
. This research finds that countries 
with a public debt overhang (defined as an episode where 
the gross public debt/GDP ratio exceeds levels 90% for 5 
years or more) have lower growth rates that last for 
considerable periods of time, “implying a massive 
cumulative output loss”. While it is difficult to be exact about 
countries gross public debt levels, known positions suggest 
that a number of countries currently fall in, or very near to, 
this category. As well as the „usual suspects‟ (Belgium, 
Iceland, Greece, Japan, Italy, Ireland, Portugal), other 
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countries that may similarly suffer include the UK and the 
USA. 
 
This finding provides further food for thought on just how 
quickly, and by how much, debt levels need to be reduced in 
the coming years. If this rebalancing is not done 
successfully then the next generation may be saddled with 
not only the debts of their parents, but also a slow growth 
future. 
 
Potential growth sources – future prospects 
Some longstanding economic problems need to be 
addressed more successfully than they have been in the 
past, in order to avoid a continuing slowing of the rise in our 
living standards
19
. With that in mind the following are key 
policy areas that most advanced economies, including the 
UK and Scotland, need to consider further. 
 
Productivity 
 
Capital deepening 
On the downside, in times of continuing government 
austerity there is likely to be reduced scope for some time to 
come in terms of „pure‟ public investment. 
 
This means that such investment is more likely to involve 
the private sector, or joint public-private (P-P) sector 
ventures. This extended degree of P-P collaboration will be 
a test for the willingness and creativity of OECD 
governments in making such alliances work effectively and 
efficiently. 
 
In particular, most countries will have growth improving 
opportunities in relation to the poor condition or 
inadequateness of some of their infrastructure, particularly 
in relation to transport (ie. congestion in terms of air travel, 
roads and rail). 
 
More investment in R&D. In the case of the UK and 
Scotland, for example, this relates to the relatively low share 
of expenditure on R&D on their knowledge base and in 
terms of the share of the workforce who work in „research‟
20
; 
 
Expansion of capacity in export activities that are geared 
towards the rapidly expanding middle classes in „emerging 
market economies‟ like China and South America. Again 
this will be challenging for the UK and Scotland as more and 
more OECD countries begin to target these high growth 
economies. 
 
Labour Quality 
On the downside, the improvement of schooling and 
expansion of higher education experienced over the past 40 
years may not be realisable again, or at least to the same 
degree, in future years, depressing productivity gains. 
 
Nevertheless research shows that opportunities exist in the 
UK and Scotland on the schooling side in terms of reducing 
variation in standards (see OECD national PISA reports) 
and in terms of improving vocational/further education 
outcomes (eg, vs Germany). 
 
Further opportunities will also arise in relation to: 
Ongoing training and apprenticeships, within companies 
Training in the future skills most needed eg, in the likely 
expansion of the social care sector 
Higher Education, in terms of the extent to which UK 
students and staff become more involved in post graduate 
studies and in business related R&D. 
 
TFP 
On the downside, the biggest gains from IT may have 
already been taken up. 
 
However, more and better use of IT in Europe, in particular 
catching up with the USA‟s use of IT in market activities, 
seems realisable. 
 
Better use, or greater uptake, of IT in public services in 
order to reverse the nil, or negative, TFP that has been 
found in this sector over recent decades. 
 
Other, non-IT related, areas of consideration, include: 
planning rules; competition and regulation (eg, in relation to 
the high cost of Health care in the USA); and the potential 
for a greater degree of international marketisation of „public‟ 
services like healthcare and tertiary education. 
 
Hours worked 
Recent policy changes, such as raising the retirement age 
(eg. in the UK) in line with rises in (healthy) life expectancy, 
should improve growth. However, to some extent this 
increase in hours, through extending the working life, will be 
partially offset by the worsening demographics, whereby 
more of the population falls outside the statutory working 
age limit
21
. 
 
Lower unemployment and reductions in other forms of non 
economic participation (eg. long term sickness) will be 
needed. This could involve a raft of potential policy areas, 
including some relating to labour quality mentioned above, 
as well as greater income related incentives. 
 
Clearly these are issues that have been around for some 
time and in relation to which past policy responses may 
have been inadequate or unworkable. For this reason 
current policy makers need to better understand and 
address the growth challenges and not simply rely on 
variations of the old policy measures used. 
 
Without such improved policy formulation, advanced 
economies risk further slowing in their economic growth 
rates. For example, in the case of the US, a recent paper by 
Robert Gordon
22 
estimated a 1.5% growth rate for GDP per 
capita over the next 20 years (2007 – 2027) This estimate 
is: well short of its historical achievement of 2.2% (1929 – 
Vol.36 No.1, pp.71-80. 
 
 
2007); around the same as was seen in the 00s up to 2007; 
and above the US experience in the 00s as a whole. 
 
In looking at possible policies to encourage higher future 
growth rates it is also important to remember that there is no 
„one size fits all‟ policy agenda. The right policies will 
depend on a good understanding of our own relative 
strengths and weaknesses. 
 
PART 4 – SUMMARY 
 
This article has looked at: 
 
• how slow the current bounce-back in economic 
growth has been following the „Great Recession‟, 
especially in comparison to previous recessions; 
 
• to what extent this has been caused by a slowing 
in the growth rate of GDP per capita over recent 
decades; 
 
• the economic and financial implications of any 
slowing of growth in the future; 
 
• some of the key policy measures that might be 
introduced in order to help push up the future 
growth rate in the UK and Scotland in coming 
years. Discussion here points the way towards the 
variety of routes that might be followed in order to 
reinvigorate future economic growth. 
 
At present the economic debate is dominated by the need 
for, and potential impact of, further fiscal stimulus in order to 
restart growth. This is an important issue that needs to 
continue to be looked at. However, an equally fundamental 
issue is what sort of growth are we seeking to restart. What 
has caused the slowdown over recent decades and can this 
slowdown be reversed or at least halted? This question has 
received much less attention of late but it is crucial in 
determining what we might expect from further stimulus 
programmes. 
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